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 *Int. J.L.M. 337  Abstract  
Purpose - This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to 
regulate directors' remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to 
understand which one better regulates directors' pay and why. It provides an account of 
the two approaches' evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of 
directors' remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both 
approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors' remuneration. 
Design/methodology/approach - The paper reviews various corporate governance 
codes, its recommendations on directors' remuneration, its effectiveness and the 
challenges it face in regulating directors' remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions 
of the Companies Act 2006 on directors' remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges 
faced. 
Findings - The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to 
regulating directors' pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting 
process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a 
challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors' pay 
adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors' 
remuneration as a management responsibility. 
Originality/value - The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to 
regulating directors' pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches 
and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper 
further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors' remuneration can be 
effective in the UK. 
Keywords Corporate governance, Remuneration committee, Directors' remuneration, 
Shareholder vote, Directors' remuneration disclosure 
Paper type General review 
 
 Introduction  
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Executive remuneration emerged as a controversial issue during the early 1990s. 
Executives of privatised utility companies received pay increases which were condemned 
by the public and the media as having no corresponding link to the performance of the 
company. The criticism of executive pay by the public and the media came under headlines 
such as "Fat Cats in the Dock" (Economist, 1995), "Executive Gluttony under Attack" 
(Cohen, 1994) and "Derailing the Gravy Train" (Sunday Times, 1995). More than two 
decades later, executive pay continues to be a prominent issue of corporate governance in 
the UK. Firstly, there is continued concern that executives are receiving excessive pay 
packages with no corresponding link to company performance (BBC News, 2012). 
Secondly, executive pay seems to be increasing even when company performance1 is 
falling. Thirdly, directors' pay (banker's bonuses) was considered as partly responsible for 
the financial crisis in 2008 (Gregg et al., 2012; Villiers, 2010), and finally, the pay gap 
between executives and average employee of the company continues to widen (BBC News, 
2013). The increase and criticisms on directors' pay attracted the *Int. J.L.M. 
338  interest of policymakers with corporate governance mechanisms making 
recommendations on directors' pay setting process and the s439A Companies Act (2006) 
highlighting shareholder responsibility to monitor directors' pay. 
The two approaches used in the regulation of directors pay emerges with corporate 
governance concentrating on the pay setting process, while the Companies Act (2006) 
concentrates on enhancing shareholder engagement. The approach adopted by corporate 
governance mechanisms can be regarded as protecting the wider interest of a company 
(which includes company members, investors, creditors, customers, employees, etc.) and 
not only the shareholders, while the Companies Act (2006) seems to only be interested in 
what the shareholders think about directors' remuneration. Shareholders may not 
necessarily take account of others interest when voting on directors' pay, but getting pay 
right at the determination process will enable the remuneration committee (RC) to think 
carefully about the company and the interest of others when setting directors' pay. 
Although corporate governance and Companies Act (2006) have adopted different 
approaches in regulating directors' pay, they both have a common goal which is to make 
directors' remuneration to be perceived as fair and transparent. This paper will examine 
both approaches, while discussing the evolution of both approaches, the effectiveness of 
both approaches and the challenges of both approaches. The paper will conclude with few 
recommendations. 
 
 Corporate governance and the determination of directors' remuneration  
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, para 2.5) to enhance 
transparency and accountability in the company's dealing. The recommendations made by 
Corporate Governance Codes on directors' remuneration are aimed at the pay setting 
stage. The aim is to ensure that there is transparency at the pay setting stage which should 
translate to what will be perceived as fair. The evolution of these mechanisms will now be 
considered. 
 
Evolution of corporate governance mechanisms on the determination of 
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directors' remuneration 
The past two and a half decades have seen the introduction and revision of reports and 
codes in corporate governance in which issues of executive remuneration have also been 
addressed. The Cadbury Report 1992 was the first corporate governance mechanism that 
sought to address amongst others public concerns on the rapid growth of directors' 
remuneration and the lack of link between pay and company performance. 
The Cadbury Report addressed the issue of executive remuneration in 3 out of its 19 
recommendations. It advocated a sharp break to what was the then traditional UK 
corporate practice of which directors determined their own pay package. The most 
important recommendation the committee made was for the board to appoint a 
remuneration committee consisting of wholly or mainly non-executive directors (NEDs) 
(Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, para 4.42). The 
responsibility of the remuneration committee was to make recommendations to the board 
on the remuneration of the directors in all forms. This recommendation marked a big 
change in the process of determining executive remuneration. The Cadbury further 
recommended that executives should be precluded from taking part in decisions relating to 
their own pay to avoid issues of conflict of interest (Committee on the Financial *Int. 
J.L.M. 339  Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, para 4.42). The remuneration 
committee was allowed to draw advice from external sources (remuneration consultants) if 
necessary. All these recommendations were geared towards the determination of directors' 
pay because they realise that the problem of excessive pay could only be solved starting 
from the roots (the determination stage). 
The Greenbury Report 1995 going a step further from Cadbury Report 1992 recommended 
that all remuneration committees should be made up of wholly NEDs (Greenbury 
Committee, 1995, para 4.8) The Greenbury Report went further to recommend that the 
REMCO should be made up of at least three NEDs or at least two NEDs in the case of small 
companies (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 4.11). The Report recognised that 
removing a director before the expiry of his office could amount to a breach of contract for 
which compensation will be paid for each year remaining on the contract and, therefore, 
recommended directors' contracts to be reduced from three years to one year as a means 
of preventing excessive golden handshakes (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 7.13). As a 
means of aligning directors' interest with that of the company, the Greenbury Report 
recommended that executive pay structure should be made up of multiple elements which 
includes base salary, benefits in kind, annual bonus, share options, other long-term 
incentive schemes and pension rights (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.14). All bonus 
schemes, share options and long-term incentive schemes were to depend on satisfactory 
performance and needed shareholder approval. Annual bonuses were to be rewarded 
based on some financial performance measures (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.19). 
Long-term performance schemes were to encourage the long-term success of the company 
subject to challenging performance criteria (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.38). 
Performance measures were to be applied relative to what other companies in the same 
industry are applying (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.39). The Greenbury Report 
failed to provide guidelines on what was to be considered as satisfactory performance, 
leaving the subject to the discretion of the remuneration committee. Share option schemes 
for directors were to be linked to long-term corporate performance and not to be offered at 
a discount. 
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The Greenbury Committee was keen on ensuring that executive remuneration be linked to 
company performance and was not bothered about the levels of pay so long as they were 
justified on the basis of company performance (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.36). 
The Greenbury Report was the first to recommend that parts of the executive remuneration 
package be tied to performance as a means of aligning the interest of the executives with 
that of the company and the shareholder. A key concern should have been for corporate 
governance to ensure, through the remuneration system, that directors share the interest 
of shareholders in making the company successful. Performance-related remuneration can 
be effective in aligning interest directors' interest with that of the company, but academic 
research has proven that directors' pay is still not or weakly linked to company 
performance (Buck et al., 2003; Gregg et al., 1993; Main et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, the Report recommended extensive disclosure on remuneration matters 
which went notably further than the disclosure requirements in the Companies Act (1985) 
and the Cadbury Report as a means of ensuring greater accountability to shareholders and 
the public. This was intended to give the shareholders information on directors' 
remuneration and how it was determined. The disclosure was to include information such 
as the remuneration of each named director with details of the various *Int. J.L.M. 
340  components of the pay package (which include base salary, annual bonus, benefit, 
share options, long-term incentive plans and compensation for loss of office) to be 
disclosed (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.14). Companies were expected to provide 
an explanation and justification whenever any element of remuneration package other 
than the basic salary was pensionable (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 6.44). All notice 
periods of more than 12 months were to be disclosed and explained together with the 
names of the directors in the annual report. The remuneration committee were to write a 
report to be included or annexed to the annual report and account of the company on 
behalf of the board. The report had to provide information on the remuneration policy and 
the actual remuneration packages including share options and pension entitlement earned 
of each named executive, and how the executive remuneration was benchmarked with 
other companies (Greenbury Committee, 1995, para 5.4). Despite the extensive disclosure 
requirement, the Report did not set a standardised format on how the companies should 
disclose this information. This left the companies to adopt disclosure format that they 
deemed satisfactory and, thus, creating a variation in disclosure format amongst 
companies. Furthermore, the Report did not require shareholders to approve the general 
remuneration policy which meant that companies submit the amount of information the 
liked. 
A review of the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports led to Hampel 
Report in 1998. The Report suggested that the recommendations of Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Hampel be integrated into a single Code of Corporate Governance. However, Hampel 
did not advance the debate on executive remuneration; rather, it re-iterated and laid more 
emphasis on the provisions of the Greenbury Report. The recommendations of the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and the Hampel Reports were consolidated in the Combined Code 
1998. The code was appended to the listing rules with on a "comply or explain" basis. 
The Higgs Report in 1998 focused on the effectiveness of NEDs. Following the 
recommendation of the Greenbury Report, Higgs recommended that the remuneration 
committee should comprise at least three members, all of whom should be independent 
NEDs (Derek Higgs, 2003, para 13.11). The Higgs Report recommended that the 
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remuneration committee should be responsible for setting pay for executive directors, 
senior executives and chairman and for appointing remuneration consultants (Derek 
Higgs, 2003). Higgs emphasised on the NEDs independence from the board and 
recommended that the board identifies in its annual report its independent NEDs, 
explaining why they are considered independent (Derek Higgs, 2003, para 9.11). 
The Combined Code 2003, 2006 and 2008 picked up on the recommendations from 
Cadbury to Higgs and went further from the Combined Code 1998 to recommend that a 
significant proportion of the executive remuneration should be structured so as to link 
rewards to corporate or individual performance (FRC, 2003). The Code cautioned that 
where the executive directors or senior management were involved in advising or 
supporting the remuneration committee, care should be taken to recognise and avoid 
conflicts of interest (FRC, 2003). Directors' eligibility for annual bonuses and long-term 
award schemes were subject to satisfactory performance and required all new long-term 
schemes proposed to be approved by shareholders (FRC, 2003). It also recommended the 
performance evaluation of the REMCO by the board annually. The Combined Code 2006 
recommended that the chairperson of the company could serve on the REMCO where 
he/she was considered independent at the time of appointment. Apart from these few 
*Int. J.L.M. 341  changes, all the provisions remained the same. The Combined Code 
2008 contained the same recommendations on executive remuneration as the Combined 
Code 2006. 
Despite the updates on the Combined Codes, executive remuneration continued to be in 
the spotlight with constant increase in executive pay with little or no relationship with the 
company's performance (Gregg et al., 2012). Coupled with the banking crisis of 2007 and 
2008 in the UK in which the government had to save five banks from collapsing led to the 
Walker Review (Walker, 1999). This committee was set up by the government chaired by 
Sir David Walker to look at corporate governance in the banking sector. 
One significant problem that contributed to the banking crisis was the excessive risk taken 
by the banks. It was argued that excessive executive remuneration by the use of bonus 
payments encouraged excessive risk taking by the executives (Bloomfield, 2013, p. 144). 
Pay arrangements in the financial industries that provided bonus payment to some staff in 
the bank as an integral part of their pay package, encouraged recklessness in respect of 
valuation of assets and the calculation of profits (Bebchuk, 2012). Executive bonus rewards 
were linked to short-term performance rather than the long-term performance 
recommended by the Combined Code. The main changes of Walker Review were to ensure 
that performance-related remuneration is linked to long-term success and that the 
remuneration incentives are compatible with risk policies and systems. The Walker Review 
recommended that the remuneration committee should have a sufficient understanding of 
the company's approach to pay and employment conditions to ensure that it is adopting a 
coherent approach to remuneration in respect of all employees (Walker, 1999, p. 28). 
The Walker Review recommended an extension of the role of the REMCO to cover firm-wide 
remuneration policy. This was to ensure that the committee had appropriate oversight of 
the overall remuneration policy of the entity with particular focus on the risk dimension 
relevant to performance conditions, deferment and claw-back. The Review recognised that 
reward by bonuses which had been locked into the structure of corporate governance by 
the Greenbury Report might be an unsuitable way of rewarding the executives (Bloomfield, 
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2013, p. 144). 
It further recommended that the remuneration committee should oversee the 
remuneration policy and outcomes in respect of all "high-end" employees (Walker, 1999, 
p. 29). The REMCO report should confirm the review of remuneration arrangements for the 
"high-end" group, satisfaction with the link between performance objectives remuneration 
structure; and disclose the principles underlying performance objectives and remuneration 
structures. The total remuneration of the "high-end" group, in bands, indicating numbers 
of executives in each band should be disclosed (Walker, 1999, pp. 31-32). Despite calls for 
disclosure of salaries of high-earning individuals, Walker does not require banks to name 
high earners because of issues of privacy - commercial confidentiality. Rather an 
anonymous disclosure of salary packages in excess of £1 million disclosure of high-end 
employees (whether board members or not) falling into bands from £1-£2.5 million, 
£2.5-£5 million and £5 million upwards, with details provided of the main elements of 
salary, cash and deferred bonus, performance-related long-term awards and pension 
contribution. The Review recommended claw backs to be used in cases of material 
misstatement and misconduct (Walker, 1999, p. 33). 
A review of the Walker Review, by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)2 led to a new code 
with a change of name from the Combined Code to the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Parts of the Walker Report that applied to all companies were *Int. J.L.M. 
342  incorporated into the UK Corporate Governance Code, and those that applied only to 
the banking sector were left as example of best practice. The recommendations of the Code 
apply to a wide range of companies, but only listed companies must comply or explain 
regardless of whether they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere. 
A review of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 led to the publication of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2014. The Code made a few changes in relation to executive 
remuneration. The Code recommends that executive directors' remuneration should be 
designed as to promote the long-term success of the company which was a supporting 
principle under the 2012 Code to a main principle (FRC, 2014, p. 1). This principle is 
emphasising on the importance of linking executive remuneration to company 
performance because executive pay is presumed to lack a link between pay and 
performance. The Code emphasised that the remuneration committee should consider 
demanding directors to hold shares for a period after the vesting or exercised before selling 
it (FRC, 2014, p. 1). Shares granted or other forms of deferred remuneration should not 
vest or be paid or exercised in less than three years and longer periods may be appropriate 
(FRC, 2010). 
 
The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms 
Corporate governance's approach to regulating directors' pay lies in the ability to get the 
pay setting process right. This could intend mean the effectiveness of the remuneration 
committee because it is their responsibility to set pay. This is because the approach 
adopted by corporate governance in regulating directors' pay is rooted in getting the pay 
determination process right which is the responsibility of the remuneration committee. This 
involves two stages, getting the right people on the remuneration committee and for the 
remuneration committee to set pay taking into account the recommendations of corporate 
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governance mechanisms. It is worth noting that almost all of the listed companies in the UK 
have a remuneration committee. 
Evidence on the adoption of remuneration committees was provided by the study carried 
out by Conyon (1994) which revealed that between 1988 and 1993, the percentage of UK 
quoted companies with remuneration committee (RCs) had risen from 54 to 94 per cent. 
Conyon and Peck (1998) found out that nine out of ten companies reported REMCOs, 
indicating that most companies were using the REMCO to determine executive pay rather 
than allowing the executives to set their own pay (Kova%3Fcević, 2008). 
Despite the justification of having remuneration committee to determine executive pay, 
past research has provided a mixed results as to the committee's effectiveness. Early 
studies on remuneration committee by Main et al. (1995) found out that executives of 
companies without a remuneration committee were paid 24 per cent more than executives 
whose board had remuneration committee. This indicated that remuneration committee 
has an important and positive role in controlling boardroom remuneration. Conyon (1997) 
examined the existence of remuneration committee and directors' remuneration and found 
that the presence of the remuneration committee was associated with lower growth in 
director remuneration, thereby supporting the findings of Main et al. (1995). There are 
strong theoretical reasons for expecting the remuneration committee to exert an influence 
on top executive pay for the interest of the company and its stakeholders at large. In their 
role to act as independent arbiters of executive remuneration, they also have to respond 
competitively towards market pressure and design a remuneration contract that ensures 
executive have an incentive to behave *Int. J.L.M. 343  consonantly with shareholder 
interest (Fattorusso, 2006). Contrary to the findings of Main et al. (1995) and Conyon 
(1997) above, Main and Johnston (1993), Conyon and Peck (1998), Dalton et al. (1999) 
found little evidence to support the fact that the remuneration committee tailored 
executive pay to produce incentive effects that are beneficial to the company and its 
shareholders. Studies demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the remuneration committee 
have more evidence than those that demonstrate its effectiveness. This is further 
supported by a study carried out by the High Pay Centre (High Pay Centre, 2012), 
demonstrating that the composition of the remuneration committee may be part of the 
reasons of its ineffectiveness. The high pay that executives receive because of the 
presence of the remuneration committee could be attributed to the lack of independence of 
the remuneration committee from the executives3. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) found that 
with the presence of the remuneration committee, directors who were underpaid relative to 
the market had their pay increased, but directors who were overpaid received no parallel 
downward adjustments. They suggested that a kind of opportunistic relationship existed 
between the executive and NEDs who sit on each other's committees and thereby bid up 
executive earnings (Conyon and Peck, 1998). This study was supported by O'Reilly et al. 
(19+98) who suggested that executive pay is driven by expectations stemming from social 
norms in which individuals base their judgments on a self-referential point (personal 
preferences, situation and circumstances). Their study suggested that the remuneration 
committee perhaps set executive remuneration level based initially on their own level4 
which ends up with higher pay levels. They found that the average salary of the 
remuneration committee members (in relation to their own executive jobs) had a positive 
effect on executive pay. This means that the remuneration committee is not having the 
desired effect on the setting of executive remuneration, consequently pushing up pay 
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levels that are not related to company performance. Johnston's (2007) study, which 
examined the association between market forces and internal control on the remuneration 
contracting process, found out that the appointment of executives to the remuneration 
committee is not associated with an opportunistic behaviour to set pay in their 
self-interest. The study also found out that the appointment of at least three NEDs to the 
committee was associated with lower levels of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration. 
Their findings demonstrate that having executives on the remuneration committee could 
still restrain excessive executive remuneration. This study was further supported by 
another study by Gregory-Smith (2009) who examined remuneration committee and CEO 
influence on the remuneration setting process. He found out that the composition of the 
remuneration committee did not affect CEO remuneration levels. These finding suggested 
that using remuneration committees in setting the remuneration of executives did not 
achieve a significant link between executive pay and company performance (Daily et al., 
1998). 
The remuneration committee is expected to design reward structures with a significant part 
of it based on challenging performance conditions so as to align executive pay with the 
company's performance which seems unattainable from past studies (Conyon and Peck's, 
1998). Main and Johnston (1993), analysing the composition of the remuneration 
committee and its role in the setting of executive pay, found out that the presence of the 
remuneration committee was associated with higher levels of executive remuneration with 
no corresponding link to company performance. Conyon and Peck's (1998) study found out 
that the independence of the remuneration committee *Int. J.L.M. 344  from the 
executives is associated with higher CEO remuneration levels and stronger pay for 
performance relationship. This study tends to suggest that the lack of the remuneration 
committee's independence from the executives may result in a weak link between 
executive pay and company performance. Benito and Conyon (1999), analysing the 
determinants of directors' remuneration, found weak evidence that the presence of the 
remuneration committee led to stronger pay for performance relationship. Capezio et al. 
(2011), examining the role of the remuneration committee of 663 large companies from 
1999 to 2006, found no evidence that independent remuneration committee were 
associated with better alignment of total CEO remuneration to company performance. The 
relationship between executive pay and company performance is one of the crucial 
outcomes that are expected of the remuneration committee when setting pay. These 
results demonstrate that the remuneration committee is ineffective in the determination of 
executive pay. 
The inability of the remuneration committee to restrain executive pay was further 
demonstrated by Main et al. (2007). They found that, first, the remuneration committee 
felt constrained in their choice of pay design by institutional cultures and values particularly 
with regards to long-term incentive schemes. Second, the remuneration committee does 
not allocate sufficient time to calibrate or confirm remuneration plans. Finally, most of their 
actions are dominated by a perceived need to justify high pay outcomes. Ogden and 
Watson (2012) examined how the remuneration committee's decisions on executive pay 
are influenced by the remuneration consultants. They found out that the remuneration 
committee are proactive in managing pay policy and ensuring that pay is regarded as 
appropriate and not over generous (Ogden and Watson, 2012). They also found out that 
the remuneration committee's understanding of the wider pay environment makes them to 
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increase pay so as to avoid losing its executives who may seek for higher pay in other 
companies (Ogden and Watson, 2012). This findings provides more support to the earlier 
research on the fact that the remuneration committee and not able to restrain executive 
pay. 
The remuneration committee, as discussed earlier in the paper, is an important committee 
of the board in the determination of executive remuneration. However, it is not effective in 
its role of restraining executive remuneration because they are not completely independent 
from the board. This ineffectiveness is reflected in the fact that executive remuneration 
continues to increase with seemingly no link to company performance, and the gap 
between executive pay and average employee pay. Although corporate governance 
approach of getting the pay setting process right is a good strategy, the non-effectiveness 
of the remuneration committee is making the approach ineffective too. 
 
Challenges face by corporate governance 
The first challenged faced by corporate governance is on how to establish an independent 
remuneration committee that will be free from the influence of the executives of the 
company. Some of the NEDs that sit on the remuneration committee are executive 
directors' of other companies. Although it can be argued that their experience as 
executives gives them a greater inside to understand and set directors pay, this also places 
the NEDs in a sympathising position, as they identify their interest with those of the 
directors. Furthermore, benchmarking practice could influence the directors to set a 
generous pay package because they are aware that it will also affect their pay *Int. J.L.M. 
345  packages in the company where they act as executive directors through the process 
of benchmarking. 
Corporate Governance mechanisms operate on a "comply or explain" basis and forms part 
of the listing rules (FSA, 2007). This simply means that were a company does not comply 
with the recommendations of corporate governance mechanisms, they should provide a 
reason as to why they did not. A departure from the Code does not automatically mean a 
breach of the Code (FSA, 2007). Academic studies that have examined the rule 
demonstrate that companies are not adequately explaining the reason for non-compliance 
or not giving reasons at all (Thornton, 2013). Therefore, the biggest challenge of corporate 
governance mechanism is the enforcement of the recommendations. 
Another challenge faced by the corporate governance mechanisms failure to define what 
company performance is and the which performance measures companies should use that 
measure what will be considered as long-term performance of the company and short-term 
performance. Companies tend to use different performance measures as well as past 
studies tend to use different performance measures when investigating the link between 
pay and performance. This use of different performance measures tend to produce mixed 
results, even though, generally, pay has been proven to be weakly related to directors' pay 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000). The UK Corporate Governance Code allows the remuneration 
committee to appoint remuneration consultants to advice on pay if needed. However, the 
remuneration committee may have limited knowledge on how the remuneration 
consultants arrived at their conclusions. 
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 The Companies Act 2006 and the determination of directors' 
remuneration  
The Companies Act (2006) adopts a "corrective" measure towards directors' remuneration. 
This is because it does not make provisions on how pay should be set, but on what the 
shareholders should do, if they think that directors' pay is excessive. This clearly shows the 
stand point of the Companies Act as not wanting to get involve in directors pay, as it is 
considered as a matter for the company's management. The question is "if directors" pay 
was a matter for the management, why did the Companies Act get involved. To answer this 
question, the next section will consider the evolution of the role of law in directors' pay. 
 
Evolution of the role of law on the determination of directors' 
remuneration 
The Companies Act (2006) operates on the basis that directors' by default have no lawful 
entitlement to remuneration (Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co [1883], 23 Ch D 654) unless 
otherwise than stated in the company's articles of association or in a separate contract 
(Villiers, 2010). The UK legislature's interest in executive remuneration began in the early 
1990s when the level of executive pay was rapidly increasing with tenuous links between 
pay and performance. In late 1994, the 70 per cent pay rise given to the then CEO (Mr 
Cedric Brown) of British Gas plc generated public outcry and made headlines in the press 
such as "Fat Cat in the Dock" (Economist, 1995) and "Derailing the Gravy Train" (Sunday 
Times, 1995). Mr Brown's large pay rise was criticised as at the time the company was 
implementing voluntary redundancies in relation to its employees. Parliament having 
previously argued that executive remuneration was a matter for the market and the 
shareholders (Case Study, 1996) required Mr Brown to defend his pay *Int. J.L.M. 
346  increase to the House of Commons Employment Committee. From this time onwards, 
the role of law made provisions on directors' remuneration with the aim of bringing 
transparency and accountability to directors pay and not to curb directors' pay. This was 
done introducing two major provisions into the then Companies Act (1985), requiring listed 
companies to disclose information on directors pay and giving shareholders a non-binding 
vote on directors' remuneration report. 
Before the Companies Act (2006), disclosure requirements under Companies Act (1985) 
were limited. Section 232 merely required the directors to disclose the emoluments of the 
highest paid directors and chairman, the aggregate emoluments of all directors and loss of 
office payments. The information did not have to specify who the highest paid director was 
or the remuneration of individual directors. The Act did not provide a method of disclosure, 
and also, the remuneration for the highest paid director was not broken down to the 
various components of the remuneration package. Consequently, monitoring executive 
remuneration was a difficult task, as the information available to the shareholders was 
limited (Roach, 2004). Owing to the limitations in the Companies Act (1985), the Directors' 
Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (DRRR 2002) inserted several new provisions into 
the Companies Act (1985), which were later largely transplanted into the (Companies Act, 
2006). Further disclosure requirements have been introduced into the Companies Act 
(2006) by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (2013). These greater disclosure 
requirements have been placed on the directors in relation to their remuneration as a 
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means to create an open and effective framework to increase transparency and 
accountability in the pay setting process and the quality of information disclosed (Ferri and 
Maber, 2010). The shareholders having access to information on executive remuneration 
will enable them to make informed judgements when voting on the remuneration report at 
a general meeting. Companies are required to disclose in their annual accounts aggregate 
directors' remuneration5. The rules relating to the disclosure of director's remuneration are 
contained in the Companies Act (2006), the Small Companies and Groups (Accounts and 
Director's Report) Regulations 20086 (for unquoted companies) and the Large and 
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 20087 (for 
quoted companies). 
Under Section 439 of the Companies Act (2006), shareholders were only entitled to a 
non-binding vote on the remuneration report. This meant that if the shareholders voted 
down the remuneration policy of a company that company was not compelled to act on it. 
The response to the shareholder non-binding vote was not impressive there was a need to 
strengthen the shareholder voting rights. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
(2013) inserted Section 439A into the Companies Act (2006) which requires the 
remuneration policy of quoted companies to be approved by the members of the company 
by an ordinary resolution. Quoted companies are required to produce a remuneration 
report that is split into three distinct sections, namely, a statement from the chair of 
remuneration committee; the policy report; and the implementation report. The statement 
from the chair of the remuneration committee will summarise the major decisions on 
directors' remuneration, any major changes made during the year on directors' 
remuneration and the context in which those decisions were made (Large and 
Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation, 2008). The 
policy report (Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulation, 2008) section sets out the proposed future remuneration policy which must be 
approved by a shareholder binding vote at least once every three years. The objective 
*Int. J.L.M. 347  of the policy report is to provide shareholders with adequate 
information, to get involved in the remuneration setting process. However, the policy sets 
out the terms on which executives will be paid and not the actual amount (specific figure) 
that may be paid to an executive in any particular circumstances. The implementation 
report of the remuneration report will provide a detailed explanation on how the existing 
remuneration policy was implemented in the relevant financial year - the implementation 
report must be put to an annual non-binding shareholder vote (Large and Medium-Sized 
Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation, 2008). Quoted companies are 
required to divide disclosure information into two parts, which is audit-related information 
related to payments actually made to executives in the financial year (Large and 
Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation, 2008) and 
non-audit-related information relating to the company's remuneration policy (Large and 
Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation, 2008). 
 
The effectiveness of the role of law 
The shareholder binding vote together with other powers8 given to the shareholders under 
the Companies Act (2006) represents an important mechanism of the shareholder voice in 
the UK. 
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However, shareholders lack the time and expertise needed to understand the report except 
for institutional investors who can afford pay someone to interpret the report for them. 
Consequently, an average shareholder who owns only a tiny percentage of the company's 
shares will need to incur the cost (time and money to pay experts to interpret the report) 
to be able to make informed decision on the remuneration policy when voting or, as is most 
likely, will simply abstain from voting (Roach, 2004). Shareholders who do not understand 
the remuneration process could only probably look at the level of remuneration and what 
they get as dividends to cast a vote for or against a remuneration report. The twenty-first 
century remuneration packages have developed to be more complex and technical as 
opposed to the past century remuneration packages. The complexity and technicality of 
these remuneration packages is almost defeating the very purpose of the disclosure 
requirements which was to provide shareholders with information on executive 
remuneration. 
Shareholder's voting on remuneration policy has been facilitated by the disclosure 
requirement introduced in 2002. However, only few companies saw their remuneration 
reports voted down with many shareholders abstaining from voting. Furthermore, 
shareholders' ability to have an influence on management will depend on the proportion of 
the votes which they can exercise and the use they make of these votes. Shareholder 
voting power is, therefore, predominantly aimed at institutional investors, as they hold 
large numbers of shares in a company more than an ordinary shareholder. The UK 
Stewardship Code (FRC, 2012) states that institutional investors should seek to vote at all 
annual general meetings (AGMs) where practicable. 
However, despite the concentration of equity ownership in the hands of institutions, 
shareholder voting on executive remuneration report has not increased a great deal. Only 
a small proportion of Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 companies shares are 
held by UK long-term investors. The majority of FTSE 100 companies' shares are in the 
hands of overseas shareholders (as shown in the Table I) or short-terminist 
Table I. Beneficial ownership of FTSE 100 companies and others 2012 
UK equity share 
ownership 2012 




Sector    
Rest of the world 54.5 45.9 53.2 
Insurance companies 6.2 6.5 6.2 
Pension funds 4.7 4.6 4.7 
Individuals 9.0 20.3 10.7 
Unit trust 9.3 11.2 9.6 
Investment trusts 1.7 1.9 1.7 
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Other financial 
institutions 
6.6 6.5 6.6 
Charities, churches, 
etc. 
0.6 0.5 0.6 
Private non-financial 
companies 
2.6 0.1 2.3 
Public sector9 2.9 0.1 2.5 
Banks 1.8 2.4 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Share Ownership - Share Register Survey Report 2012 
 *Int. J.L.M. 348  investors such as hedge funds that do not really care about what the 
executives take home as remuneration (Saunderland, 2012). 
From the Table I, it indicates that more than 50 per cent of FTSE 100 shares are held by 
oversees shareholders who may not be able to monitor the board because of the large 
number of companies they have in their portfolio. 
In the banking sector, many of the banks performed poorly in recent years, but the sector 
received high support on their remuneration reports casting doubts on the effectiveness of 
institutional investors in using their voting rights on executive remuneration issues. For 
example, Barclays Bank in 2011 received a 75 per cent approval for its remuneration report 
from investors despite their poor performance in stock and dividend returns (Clarke, 
2011a). However, Dong and Ozkan (2008), studying institutional investor and executive 
pay in UK companies, found out that there exist two classes of institutional investors - one 
being dedicated (in remuneration context meaning voting) and the other transient (not 
voting). Their findings showed that the dedicated institutional investors do restrain the 
level of executive pay and strengthen the pay performance relationship. These dedicated 
institutional investors use their expertise and votes to monitor the management. The 
transient institutional investors make no appreciable difference neither to the pay levels of 
the executive remuneration or strengthen the pay performance relationship indicating that 
they have failed to regulate executive remuneration (Villiers, 2010). 
Shareholder pro-activism can greatly reduce the influence shareholder could have on the 
pay determination process in a company. This disengagement by the shareholders also 
reduces the importance of the voting powers vested on the shareholders on remuneration 
matters. Consequently, shareholder binding vote may not be more effective than a 
shareholder non-binding votes and the setting of executive remuneration would still be 
inappropriately regulated. Before the shareholder vote on the remuneration report was 
introduced in 2002, the Cadbury Committee (Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, 1992) had expressed their scepticism on more powers given to the 
shareholders on remuneration issues. They predicted that *Int. J.L.M. 349  many of the 
shareholders will simply abstain from voting, and those that vote to defer in almost every 
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case to the judgment of directors and the remuneration committee. This scepticism of the 
Cadbury Committee has come true, as evidence from over the years is proving that 
shareholders are incapable of monitoring and curbing excessive directors' pay. 
The effect of directors' remuneration disclosure has been an increase on pay levels (Clarke 
et al., 1998). Clarke et al. 's (2011b) study of 342 company chairmen on listed companies 
of all sizes found out that half of the chairmen of UK companies were of the opinion that pay 
disclosure had resulted in an increase in pay levels. This is because the executives had 
used the availability of remuneration data through disclosure requirements from other 
companies to compare their pay levels of those of their peers. Executives may tend to 
demand for more pay in cases where they were paid less than their peers, or threaten to 
leave the company to other company that would offer a better pay level and structure than 
his current company. 
 
The challenges faced by the role of law 
The challenges faced by the Companies Act (2006) on directors' remuneration is the fact 
that they do not want to get involved in remuneration issues, as it is considered a matter 
for the company's board of management. Consequently, the law cannot make provisions as 
to what the directors' should be paid or what elements should make up the remuneration 
package. The none-use of shareholders voting rights to monitor directors' remuneration 
seems to have defeated the role of law's approach to regulate pay. This has left the role of 
law ineffective which is justified by continues increase in directors' remuneration in the UK. 
 
 Recommendations and conclusion  
Corporate governance mechanisms has adopted a better approach to regulating directors' 
pay which should be encouraged. Directors' remuneration can only be successfully 
regulated if the pay setting process is right. Although there are grey areas that corporate 
governance has not addressed yet, its challenge is on the lack of enforcement. The 
Companies Act (2006) position on directors' pay could be considered as a house whose 
foundation is built on sand which cannot withstand the storm when it hit. Although the 
shareholders' votes are intended to indirectly influence the pay setting process, 
shareholders have not been using the powers to influence pay setting process. The basic 
provisions needed to get the right pay package such as who should set pay, are missing in 
the Companies Act (2006); therefore, as a strict matter of law, directors' still set their own 
pay in which there is a potential for conflict of interest. There is a need for corporate 
governance mechanisms to address the grey areas and more recommendations to 
strengthen enforcement. The Companies Act (2006) may insert a provision on the 
enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms, or provisions on basic rules on the 
determination of directors' pay. It is difficult from the current stage of the two regulatory 
forms to adequately curb excessive directors' pay in the UK. 
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